The Dark Corners of the World by Reynolds, John & Xavier, Sujith
‘The Dark Corners of
theWorld’
TWAIL and International Criminal Justice
John Reynolds and Sujith Xavier
Abstract
Despite international criminal law’s historically contingent doctrines and embedded
biases,ThirdWorld self-determination movements continue to be enticed by interna-
tional criminal justice as a potentially emancipatory project. This article seeks to
peer inside the structural anatomy of the international criminal law enterprise
from a vantage point oriented to the global South. It reflects broadly on discourses
of international criminal law and its exponents as they relate to the global South,
and explores one particularly contentious issue in the politics of international crim-
inal law ç that of operational selectivity. Redressing such selectivities as they
arise from geopolitical biases is an important first step for any reconstruction of
the field of international criminal justice. The article emphasizes, however, the need
to also look beyond the problems of unequal enforcement, to reconceptualize the
forms of violence criminalized at the design level.We ask whether, given certain colo-
nial features, the premise and promise of international criminal justice can ç for
self-determination struggles or anti-imperial movements in the global South ç be
anything more than illusory. Drawing on the perspectives of Third World
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), the article concludes with some thoughts
on what ‘TWAILing’ the field of international criminal justice might entail.
In the dark corners of the world lurks the future of armed conflict. ::: The real threat to hu-
manity on several levels is bred in the fields of lawlessness in the third world. ::: Conflicts
in these dark corners are evolving into uncivilized events.1
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1. Introduction
In the spring of 2011, following the publication of a United Nations (UN) report
detailing potential international crimes committed in the Sri Lankan conflict,2
representatives from Tamil communities converged in The Hague to call for
action by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Maheswaran Ponnampalam,
chairman of the Tamil Danish Association, spoke of activists who had cycled
over a thousand kilometres to join the demonstrations: ‘It took them 18 days
to get here by bike, but they made it.We have sent multiple letters to the pros-
ecutor of the ICC asking for action. We never got a response. That’s why we
are here.’3 Since the culmination of the conflict in 2009,Tamil demonstrations
from Chennai to Toronto have repeatedly called for international criminal ac-
countability for the alleged war crimes4 committed by Sri Lankan state forces
in their onslaught against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).5 Much
of Palestinian civil society has too, for some time now, pinned similar hopes
of redress for Israeli military atrocities6 and colonization7 on the ICC, and
pushed its political and diplomatic representatives to pursue the transfer of jur-
isdiction to The Hague.8
Such impulses from the global South to appeal to liberal rule of law sensibil-
ities reveal both the allure and the pitfalls of public international law’s criminal
responsibility project. The allure is encapsulated in the illusion of universality,
promises of accountability and deterrence, and expectations of a documented
chronicle of history bearing the imprint of legal legitimacy.9 The pitfalls lie in
2 Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, SG/SM/13791-HR/
5072, 31 March 2011.
3 Maheswaran Ponnampalam, chairman of the Tamil Danish Association, quoted in M.Winters,
‘Tamils Demand Justice in Hague Protest’, Radio NetherlandsWorldwide, 18 May 2011.
4 See, for example, Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka,
supra note 2; International Crisis Group,War Crimes in Sri Lanka, Asia Report No. 191, 17 May
2010; Human Rights Watch, ‘We Will Teach You a Lesson’: Sexual Violence against Tamils by Sri
Lankan Security Forces, 26 February 2013.
5 See, for example, ‘Toronto Tamils slow traffic in latest Sri Lanka protest’, CBC News, 16 March
2009; C. Davies and A. Topping, ‘Tamils protest at diamond jubilee lunch over Sri Lanka presi-
dent’s presence’, The Guardian, 6 June 2012; ‘Protest in Chennai against war crimes against
Tamils in Sri Lanka’, Asian News International, 28 March 2013.
6 See generally Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, UN Doc. A/
HRC/12/48,15 September 2009; Report of the independent commission of inquiry established pursu-
ant to Human Rights Council resolution S-21/1, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/52, 24 June 2015.
7 See Report of the independent international fact- finding mission to investigate the implications of the
Israeli settlements on the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian
people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, UN Doc. A/HRC/
22/63, 7 February 2013.
8 See, for example, Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions National Committee,
‘Palestinian civil society welcomes the findings and recommendations of the UN Fact Finding
Mission on Israeli settlements’, 15 February 2013; Al-Haq and Palestinian Centre for Human
Rights, ‘Al-Haq and PCHR call on ICC Prosecutor to move forward on 2009 Palestinian
Declaration’, 4 October 2013.
9 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘World War I: The War to End All Wars and the Birth of a Handicapped
International Criminal Justice System’, 30 Denver Journal of International Law & Policy (2002) 244.
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international criminal law’s historically contingent doctrines and embedded
political and economic biases; its instrumentality and selectivity.10 In the out-
look of some international criminal prosecutors like David Crane, the global
South is an unruly space to which the rule of law must be delivered as part of
the newfangled civilizing mission. This echoes the views of liberalWestern dip-
lomats that ‘the laws of the jungle’ still distinguish the ‘more old-fashioned
kinds of states outside the postmodern continent of Europe’, such that ‘[t]he
conception of an international criminal court is a striking example of the post-
modern breakdown of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs.’11
International criminal law, in that sense, is aligned with an imperial discourse
devoted to imposing ‘good governance’ techniques and free market ideology.12
Despite these vertical impositions of globalization, self-determination strug-
gles and social movements in Palestine, Sri Lanka and elsewhere continue to
be enticed by international criminal justice as a potentially emancipatory pro-
ject. Our aim in this article is to peer inside the structural and ideological anat-
omy of the international criminal law enterprise ç which we understand as a
mechanism of political economy as well as global governance ç from a vant-
age point oriented to the global South. The liberation struggles in Palestine
and Sri Lanka, representative for many of the barbarity implicit in Crane’s
‘dark corners of the world’ metaphor, offer a window for this examination.
We begin in Section 2 by reflecting broadly on discourses of international
criminal law and its exponents as they relate to the global South. Section 3
then proceeds to explore one particularly contentious issue in the politics of
international criminal law ç that of selectivity. The role of the UN Security
Council, in creating international tribunals and referring cases to the ICC,
offers one window into the politics of inclusion and exclusion when it comes
to who, and what, is ultimately prosecuted. Redressing such operational selec-
tivities as they arise from geopolitical biases is an important first step for any
reconstruction of the field of international criminal justice. We emphasize,
however, the need to also look beyond the problems of unequal enforcement,
to reconceptualize the forms of violence criminalized at the design level. The
final section asks whether, given certain embedded colonial features, the prem-
ise and promise of international criminal justice can ç for self-determination
struggles or anti-imperial movements in the global South ç be anything
more than illusory. Drawing on the perspectives of ThirdWorld Approaches to
International Law (TWAIL), the article concludes with some thoughts on
what ‘TWAILing’ the field of international criminal justice might entail.
10 O. Okafor and U. Ngwaba, ‘The International Criminal Court as a ‘‘Transitional Justice’’
Mechanism in Africa: Some Critical Reflections’, 9 International Journal of Transitional Justice
(2015) 90.
11 R. Cooper, ‘The Post-Modern State’, in M. Leonard (ed.), Re-Ordering the World: The Long-term
Implications of 11 September (Foreign Policy Centre, 2002) 11, at 13, 16.
12 K. Clarke, ‘The Rule of Law Through Its Economies of Appearances: The Making of the African
Warlord’, 18 Indiana Journal of Legal Studies (2011) 7.
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2. International Criminal Justice Discourses and the
Global South
International law’s criminal justice project has been a distinctlyWestern venture.
Its crystallization at Nuremberg was ‘an expression of a peculiarly American
legal sensibility’.13 The irony of Nuremberg, in seeking to claim the moral high
ground following military victory over the Nazis by holding Nazism’s particular
brand of racial supremacy to legal account, ‘was that the adjudicating states
either condoned (or practiced as official policy) their own versions of racial
mythologies’.14 There was no question of a similar normative conception of crim-
inal accountability attaching to British and French violence in the colonies, or to
the subjugation of nativeAmericans and African Americans in the United States.15
ThirdWorld jurists were wise to such selectivity and structural biases16 from
the outset. India’s Judge Radhabinod Pal was the most prominent among a
range of Asian and Latin American voices of scepticism; his 1,235-page dissent
from the judgment of the Tokyo Tribunal denounced the Japanese prosecutions
as ‘vindictive retaliation’17 and imperialism by the war’s victors. With the
atomic bombing of Japan and acts of imperial aggression and annexation by
Allied powers exempted from any form of judicial scrutiny, Pal maintained
that the Tribunal was structurally incapable of being just. He was sharply crit-
ical of the decision by the Allies to mandate the Tribunal to retroactively pros-
ecute previously undefined crimes. This, Pal asserted, brought international
law back to its colonial foundations and its facilitation of conquest.18
The more contemporaneous proliferation of international criminal law since
the 1990s has emerged in a distinct political context in terms of core/periphery
relations: ‘post’-colonialism and formal sovereign equality; purported univer-
sality of legal norms; economic exploitation and structural inequalities config-
ured in less overt forms and obscured behind the masks of aid and
development.19 Against this backdrop, demands for international justice ç
13 K. Anderson,‘Nuremberg Sensibility:Telford Taylor’s Memoir of the Nuremberg Trials’,7 Harvard
Human Rights Journal (1994) 281, at 289.
14 M. Mutua, ‘Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals’, 11 Temple
International & Comparative Law Journal (1997) 167, at 171.
15 P. Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World 1492-1640 (Cambridge
University Press, 1997), at 16^40; B. Trigger and W.Washburn, ‘Native Peoples in Euro-American
Historiography’, in B. Trigger and W.Washburn (eds), The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples
of theAmericas (Cambridge University Press, 1996), at 61^81.
16 On the nature of structural bias in the institutions (and language) of international law, see M.
Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge
University Press, 2005 reissue), at 600^615.
17 United States et al. v. Araki Sadao et al., International Military Tribunal for the Far East,
Dissentient Judgment of Justice Pal (Kokusho-Kankokai, 1999), at xxi.
18 Justice Pal states: ‘When international law will have to allow a victor nation thus to define a
crime at his will, it will ::: find itself back on the same spot whence it started on its apparently
onward journey several centuries ago.’ Ibid., at 23^24.
19 K. Clarke, Fictions of Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Challenges of Legal Pluralism
in Sub-Saharan Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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across political, economic and environmental spectra ç are often seen as
emanating from an aggrieved global South. The response from Northern sites
of power has typically been to create international institutions that are con-
trolled, technical and expert-driven. This has come to include criminal tribu-
nals for the purposes of addressing the conduct of war and the perpetration
of direct physical violence, amongst other tools of transitional justice.20 The
outcomes of judicialisation have been predictably uneven. There is a drive to
prosecute some of those responsible for some atrocities, but certainly no prac-
tical push towards geopolitical egalitarianism in who or what is prosecuted.
This underlying contradiction informs the very nature of each criminal in-
stitution as much as it shapes the relations amongst them. Highly contested de-
cisions taken by these institutions exemplify the challenges of developing any
kind of truly ‘international’ criminal law. In this sense, little has changed
since the post-World War II military tribunals, when Georg Schwarzenberger
argued that the idea of international criminal law was a contradiction in
terms, and that unless or until it found a way around natural self-interests, it
would remain an expression of global power politics.21 Indeed, the idea of
Nuremberg as the birthplace of an international criminal law is belied by the
fact that the four major war-victorious powers appointed a prosecutor each,
rather than the tribunal epitomizing any sense of a global community of na-
tions acting collectively.
The two foundational ad hoc tribunals in the 1990s were viewed suspi-
ciously from a Third World perspective,22 with the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda seen as a tokenistic corollary of its Balkan counterpart:
its creation had been rendered unavoidable only by the immediate Yugoslav
precedent and belated western guilt over the Rwandan genocide.23 Concerns
over selectivity have manifested in response to the inherent exclusivity
involved in the creation of such country-specific ad hoc tribunals, as well as
politically contingent approaches to prosecution within them. The
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia declining to investi-
gate NATO military operations in Kosovo offered a clear example of this, raising
for TWAIL scholars ‘disturbing questions about the neutrality and objectivity
of this Tribunal’.24 The various special courts, hybrid tribunals and
20 J. Alvarez, ‘Alternatives to International Criminal Justice’, in A. Cassese et al. (eds), The Oxford
Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 2009).
21 G. Schwarzenberger, ‘The Problem of an International Criminal Law’, 3 Current Legal Problems
(1950) 263.
22 For a sceptical reading of the ICTYand the general dangers of individual accountability initiatives
‘becoming, simply, the reproduction of the civilizing mission and victor’s justice’, see A. Anghie
and B.S. Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in
Internal Conflicts’, 2 Chinese Journal of International Law (CJIL) (2003) 77, at 91^92.
23 As Cassese explains: ‘[S]ensitive to the criticisms that the establishment of the ICTY represented
yet another illustration of the disproportionate attention paid to the problems of Europe vis-a' --
vis the developing world, the international community was also anxious to establish a
Tribunal for Rwanda so as to assuage its conscience and shield itself from accusations of
double standards.’A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2003), at 339.
24 Anghie and Chimni, supra note 22, at 91.
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extraordinary chambers established since then, while presented as collective
initiatives, have nonetheless predominantly focused on prosecuting weak or
pariah regimes in the global South. In this sense, the Third World critique of
international criminal law extends beyond those expositions that focus only
on the ICC’s preoccupation with Africa.
In the initial emergence of the permanent International Criminal Court,
however, support for the enterprise from states and civil society on the
African continent in particular was markedly enthusiastic. Swift and wide-
spread ratification of the Rome Statute bore witness to that. In seeking to ex-
plain why, contrary to expectations in Rome, the Court was so warmly
embraced by states from Africa, international criminal law scholars framed its
appeal in opposition to other international institutions that had proved unwill-
ing or unable to address African concerns. In this telling, ‘they turned to a
new experiment in global justice that did not seem to be characterized by the
traditional dialectic of north and south, rich and poor, first world and third
world, Great Powers and everyone else. The Court appeared genuinely egalitar-
ian in structure and profoundly fair in conception’.25
Appearances, of course, can be deceptive. The role given to the Security
Council implied a preservation of pre-existing power dynamics and amounted
to little more than ‘a rusty fac ade’ to shield the permanent members from ex-
posure to jurisdiction, prompting Immi Tallgren to ask from the outset: ‘Are
we not just writing yet another chapter to the stale story of the Strong and
theWeak in international law?’26 And yet, while actual progress in prosecuting
even the weak has been stilted at best since the coming into force of the
Rome Statute in 2002, the progress narrative around the ICC remains almost
irrepressible. Remarks framing international criminal law developments as
‘the most profound current aspect of international law’27 are as commonplace
now as they were at the Rome Conference. An inversion of sorts in global
North^South dynamics around the court has also occurred, however. While
the United States has abandoned its initial reticence and come to see the ICC
as a useful tool in its soft power armoury, the African Union’s love for this
latest chapter in ‘the new tribunalism’28 is turning cold. This has been fuelled
by unmistakeable selectivity and geographic bias, whereby the investigation
and prosecution of Africans is resoundingly more palatable and expedient for
Western powers than that of British, Canadian or Israeli officials.
25 W. Schabas, ‘The Banality of International Justice’, 11 Journal of International Criminal Justice
(2013) 545, at 548. Alternate explanations for the high level of ratifications byAfrican states in-
clude the desire to signal their human rights credentials to, and in some cases to satisfy the ex-
plicit conditions of, foreign donors.
26 I. Tallgren,‘We Did It? TheVertigo of Law and Everyday Life at the Diplomatic Conference on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court’, 12 Leiden Journal of International Law (LJIL)
(1999) 683, at 695.
27 D. Forsythe, ‘‘‘Political Trials?’’ The UN Security Council and the Development of International
Criminal Law’, in W. Schabas et al. (eds), The Ashgate Research Companion to International
Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives (Ashgate, 2013), at 475.
28 T. Skouteris, ‘The New Tribunalism: Strategies of (De)Legitimation in the Era of International
Adjudication’, 17 FinnishYearbook of International Law (2006) 307.
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From a moment of apparent convergence between calls for justice from the
global South and the materialization of a ‘hard’ international criminal law,
what has emerged is a project that reveals and reproduces much of the interna-
tional legal terrain’s embedded colonial architecture. In both its normative
and institutional conceptualizations, and now its functioning in practice,
international criminal law opens itself up to some obvious critiques from a
TWAIL perspective. Foremost among them is the question of who is prosecuted,
and by whom. The fact of some ‘self-referrals’ from African jurisdictions has
not carried sufficient resonance as to overcome the sense of an expert class,29
the professional centre, administering justice to the periphery. Despite con-
certed work by civil society organizations and social movements to push the
Office of the Prosecutor to act on allegations against British forces in Iraq,
Canada’s treatment of Afghan detainees, or the alleged crimes of Western
allies in Israel and Colombia, the ICC’s reputation remains marked by the fix-
ation of its prosecutorial lens on Africa through its first 15 years of operation.30
The colonial intimations of that relationship were epitomized in the image of
former Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo emerging from his helicopter on the
green plains of the Democratic Republic of the Congo sporting the starchest
of white suits.31 Makau Mutua’s ‘savage-victim-saviour’32 triangulation is in-
stantaneously evoked; Ocampo the embodiment of the crusading knight in
shining linen on hand to save disempowered victims from the savagery of
their own.33 He has not been alone in this ideological expedition. David
Crane, the first prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in situating
himself at ‘the cutting edge of international law with all its professional excite-
ment at the legal, political, and diplomatic levels’, is forthright in acknowled-
ging the role of his institution in ‘imposing white man’s justice upon third
29 B.S. Chimini, ‘Prolegomena to a Class Approach to International Law’, 21 European Journal of
International Law (EJIL) (2010) 57; S. Xavier, ‘Theorising Global Governance Inside Out: A
Response to Professor Ladeur’, 3 Transnational Legal Theory (2012) 268.
30 The South Ossetia investigation that was sanctioned by the Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber in early
2016 [Decision on the Prosecutor’s request for authorization of an investigation, Situation in
Georgia (ICC-01/15), Pre-Trial Chamber 1, 27 January 2016] marks the first ICC investigation
outside of the African continent, and has its own geopolitical dynamic in which ‘investigating
Russian conduct captures that broader, if not always helpful, international narrative condemn-
ing Russian aggression.’ Mark Kersten, ‘Why is the International Criminal Court stepping out
of Africa and into Georgia?’ TheWashington Post, 5 February 2016.
31 Preserved for posterity on the cover poster of Barry Stevens’ 2011 documentary, Prosecutor. See
also D. Saunders, ‘International Law Should Not Be a White-Suited Hero’, published in The
Globe and Mail as ‘Ocampo’s Crusades Tainted the Idea of International Justice’, 25 February
2012.
32 M. Mutua, ‘Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights’, 42 Harvard
International Law Journal (2001) 201.
33 This is notwithstanding Ocampo’s Argentinean nationality and role as Assistant Prosecutor in
the 1985 ‘Trial of the Juntas’. It is illustrative of the ways in which global South elites are impli-
cated in international institutional imperialism, and of the fact that being an international
lawyer from the ThirdWorld does not mean one will necessarily engage in a TWAIL praxis.
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world conflicts’.34 In a moment of profound introspection, he asks whether ‘the
international justice we seek to impose’ is the same justice that ‘the victims of
a third world conflict seek’,35 and concedes some hard truths:
We simply don’t think about or factor in the justice the victims seek. :::We approach the in-
sertion of international justice paternalistically. I would even say with a self-righteous atti-
tude that borders on the ethnocentric. :::We consider our justice as the only justice. :::We
don’t contemplate why the tribunal is being set up, and for whom it is being established. :::
After set up, we don’t create mechanisms by which we can consider the cultural and cus-
tomary approaches to justice within the region.36
While acknowledging this paternalism, self-righteousness and ethnocen-
trism, Crane at the same time indulges in it, arguing that any endeavour to
contemplate local or regional alternatives to white man’s justice ‘runs smack
into a brick wall when considering locally, culturally oriented justice vis-a' -vis
Africa, a continent led by a brotherhood where the rule of law is a tool by
which to seek and maintain power’.37 This may appear cynical to his audience,
the former Special Court prosecutor warns, but: ‘it is true from my perspective
and experience living and working at the edge of the world ç West Africa’.38
Oscillating between respect and revile for west African culture, Crane, in a
quintessentially Orientalist-style rendition, goes to some length to emphasize
his credentials and expertise on the region: ‘As a student of West African cul-
ture, with a graduate degree in West African Studies, I traveled to Sierra
Leone with an appreciation of the rich and vibrant culture of the region and
factored that into my general and prosecutorial strategy.’39
What that entails, apparently, is an understanding of west Africa (in its en-
tirety) as ‘a lawless land ::: a region that has never really known the rule of
law’.40 It is in the global South, Crane’s ‘dark corners of the world’, that this law-
lessness breeds real and imminent threat to what ‘we’41 understand as human-
ity and civilization.
Fertilized by greed and corruption, what grows out of these regions of the world are terror,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Conflicts in these dark corners are evolving into
uncivilized events. They appear to be less political and are more criminal in origin and
scope. ::: Respect for the law of armed conflict decreases or disappears entirely in this new
type of warfare as the involvement of the criminal element increases. ::: These dark corners
become havens for these criminal elements.42
34 D. Crane, ‘White Man’s Justice: Applying International Justice after Regional Third World
Conflicts’, 27 Cardozo Law Review (2006) 1683, at 1683^1684.
35 Ibid., at 1685.
36 Ibid., at 1686.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., at 1685.
40 Crane, ‘Dancing with the Devil’, supra note 1, at 2, 8.
41 On the ‘we’of international criminal law, see Tallgren, supra note 26.
42 Crane, ‘Dancing with the Devil’, supra note 1, at 4.
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The framing of Third World conflicts as apolitical, of course, elides the
impact of contemporary imperial and neoliberal world-systems dynamics on
‘underdeveloped’ regions that are exploited for their natural resources (as well
as denying the internal political contestations that often stem from historical
phenomena of colonial economic exploitation, political subjectification and
border fabrication), and allows for a technocratic response based on simple
criminality/legality binaries.43 Crane himself though appears to run into
contradictions even in attempting to deploy this reductive discourse. He
claims that the ‘corruption so endemic in these societies ::: fosters a healthy
lack of respect for institutions of any kind’, and invokes Louis Brandeis to
underline that ‘[i]f we desire respect for the law we must first make the law re-
spectable.’44 In his ensuing discussion, however, Crane offers nothing to sug-
gest that he actually does see a certain wariness of institutionalized
structures as healthy, nor does he entertain Brandeis’ notion of the law’s poten-
tial respectability deficit in the context of Sierra Leone and Liberia. Quite the
contrary: lack of respect for the law and for institutions is the powder keg that
ignites criminality and warmongering in the region. The rule of law is the
only satisfactory extinguisher: ‘at the end of the day, the citizens of a war torn
region must come to understand three things related to the law, that it is fair,
that no one is above it, and that the rule of law is far more powerful than the
rule of the gun’.45 This idealized rule of law stands in marked contrast to
the state of nature depicted by Crane in his Prosecution statements during
the trials of the Revolutionary United Front leaders, whereby Sierra Leone is
the setting for ‘a tale of horror, beyond the gothic into the realm of Dante’s in-
ferno’, populated by ‘dark shadows’and ‘hounds from hell’.46
Given the failure of the post-colonial African state in this narrative, the
international criminal institution is presented as the only viable answer.
Thus, following the semblance of an apparently sensible approach to local
engagement (albeit couched in management speak47), as both practitioner
and scholar Crane abstains from any attempt to consider alternatives to the
imposition of justice from above. Instead, his concern is with the politics
and public relations of how best to counter populist claims of legal
imperialism:
African leaders can easily manipulate popular thinking by loudly declaring that the justice
being imposed (and threatening the status quo or a leader’s power) is ‘white man’s justice,’
playing upon the fears of colonialism as a way of excusing the rampant corruption and im-
punity that is Africa, particularlyWest Africa. This is a real problem and without the care-
ful consideration by all of us on how best to come up with practical ways to counter the
43 Clarke, supra note 12.
44 Crane, ‘Dancing with the Devil’, supra note 1, at 4 (emphasis added), quoting Louis D. Brandeis,
The Brandeis Guide to the ModernWorld (Alfred Lief ed., 1941), at 166.
45 Ibid., at 8. Emphasis added.
46 Transcript, Sesay, Kallon, and Gbao (SCSL-04-15-T),Trial Chamber, 5 July 2004, at 19.
47 ‘Get out and listen to the citizens of the region. Interface with them.’ Crane,‘White Man’s Justice’,
supra note 34, at 1687.
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‘white man’s justice,’ claims by cynical African politicians, and others, establishing the rule
of law permanently there will be illusory.’48
In advocating ‘the imposition of international justice norms in an African
context’,49 Crane’s vision of justice is, ultimately, what he unashamedly de-
scribes as white man’s justice, implemented through the universalizing dis-
course of international norms. ‘At the end of the day, Africans will have to
decide on how best to tackle corruption and lack of good governance’; if they
fail to accept the norms imposed, however, ‘Africa will move backwards and
become the shanty town of the global community’.50 While Crane may be at
the more extreme (or honest) end of the spectrum of Eurocentric paternalism,
his stance is representative of much of the disciplinary thinking and world-
views that have underpinned the development and operation of international
criminal institutions.
In his dissection of selected witness testimony at the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, legal anthropologist Gerhard Anders points to the soliciting of certain wit-
nesses by the prosecution that tended ‘to represent the accused persons as abso-
lute evil, and Africa as primitive and lawless’, and that ‘spoke to a deep-seated
Western fascination for Africa’s ‘savagery’ and ‘primitivism’.51 Certain events were
deliberately highlighted in the prosecution’s witness examination, even though
they occurred outside the territorial and temporal jurisdiction of the court, ‘be-
cause they resonated with entrenchedWestern stereotypes of African ‘‘culture’’.’52
Anders notes that Crane’s depictions of the ‘dark corners of the world’evokes a dis-
tinctly Conradian image of Africa as ‘one of the dark places of the earth’53 and
the exemplary ‘racialized dualism of white/dark’.54 This imagery is echoed in the
critiques of black lawyers engaged as defence counsel in international criminal
trials, who have argued that the West’s ‘persistent idea of Africa being the Dark
Continent, uncivilised’ has rendered international criminal justice as a platform
to ‘teach these darkies about the rule of law.’55
Conrad’s exploration of colonialism is, of course, not simply black and white;
Marlow’s dual voices in Heart of Darkness (one denouncing colonialism, the
other idealizing it) find echoes in international criminal law’s own dualism
(universality versus selectivity) as well as Crane’s vacillation between regard
and dismay for native Sierra Leone. Here, ‘the corrupting effects of colonialism
at both personal and political level’56 are mirrored in the effects of being an
48 Ibid., at 1686.
49 Ibid., at 1687.
50 Ibid.
51 G. Anders, ‘Testifying about ‘Uncivilized Events’: Problematic Representations of Africa in the
Trial against Charles Taylor’, 24 LJIL (2011) 937, at 940-942.
52 Ibid., at 946.
53 J. Conrad, Heart of Darkness (William Blackwood & Sons, 1902), at 4.
54 V. Nesiah, ‘Placing International Law:White Spaces on a Map’, 16 LJIL (2003) 1, at 4.
55 Courtenay Griffiths QC, quoted in T. Black, ‘Let’s Teach These Darkies About the Rule of Law’,
Spiked, 29 May 2012.
56 Anghie and Chimni, supra note 22, at 100.
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international criminal law professional discharging the vestiges of colonial
justice.
The reality of Western universalism has been a significant part of the story
of the African Union reconsidering its relationship with the ICC.57 This was
the primary focus of the October 2013 Extraordinary Session of the Assembly.
The session culminated in a decision which expressed a number of the
African Union’s concerns around the Court and called for, amongst other
things, the setting up of a contact group of the African Union Council to
engage with the UN Security Council members ‘on all concerns of the AU on
its relationship with the ICC, including the deferral of the Kenyan and
Sudanese cases’.58 The narrative of international criminal law as an imperial
imposition has without doubt been co-opted to a certain degree by post-colo-
nial elites, as evidenced in the African Union discourse generally, and the
moves of specific national leaders and institutions.59 That the African Union
requests were so swiftly rejected in November 2013 by the Security Council,
however, brings into sharp focus once more the Council’s governmental role
in relation to the ICC.
3. Selectivity, Geopolitics and the International
Criminal Court
The North^South dynamics playing out through the International Criminal
Court can be discerned by zeroing in on what has been included and excluded
from those situations subjected to investigation and prosecution before the
Court. Questions around how situations are referred to the Court, how the
Court takes jurisdiction over situations, and how the Prosecutor’s discretion is
exercized, are pivotal. The fact that Western powers have not been subject to
this jurisdiction is no accident or anomaly. Robin Cook, British Foreign
Secretary under the Blair administration at the time of the ICC’s negotiation
and establishment, represented the Western diplomatic viewpoint clearly: ‘this
is not a court set up to bring to book prime ministers of the United Kingdom
or presidents of the United States’.60
57 This has not been the only stimulant, however, with the ICC serving in some instances as a site
for domestic politics and self-interests to be pursued, as exemplified in the Kenya situation, as
well as the African Union making pointed legal arguments over questions of head of state im-
munity. See A. Kiyani, ‘Al-Bashir & the ICC: The Problem of Head of State Immunity’, 12 CJIL
(2013) 467.
58 Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa, 11^12 October 2013,
Decision no. 1: Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC),
Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1.
59 See, for example, L. Mullen, ‘Kenya Lawmakers Approve Motion toWithdraw from ICC’, Jurist, 5
September 2013, at http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2013/09/kenya-parliament-approves-
motion-to-withdraw-from-icc.php (visited 24 June 2016).
60 Quoted in J. Graubart and L. Varadarajan, ‘Taking Milosevic Seriously: Imperialism, Law, and
the Politics of Global Justice’, 27 International Relations (2013) 439, at 439.
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By 2016, the ICC had become actively seized of 10 situations in which in-
vestigations and/or prosecutions are underway, almost all of which involve
African states and indictees. A number of these were self-referrals by
African state parties, as successive Prosecutors have been at pains to point
out in defending the Court against claims of geographic and racialized bias.
In practice, however, such self-referrals by ‘weak’ states have primarily oper-
ated as a mode of capitalizing on the state-centrism of international law for
the purposes of delegitimizing internal opponents and replicating patterns
of exclusion and othering in the post-colonial context.61 The Office of the
Prosecutor has shown itself happy to indulge this by not investigating the
government of any self-referring state to date. The Office of the Prosecutor
further initiated two proprio motu investigations of its own volition, in
Kenya and Co“ te d’Ivoire.
Our present focus, however, is on the Security Council’s particular role and
its power to refer a situation to the Court. Such Security Council referrals are
one of the three trigger mechanisms set out in Article 13 of the ICC Statute
by which the Court’s jurisdiction over a situation can be activated, and are dis-
tinct from proprio motu investigations and state party referrals. The Pre-Trial
Chamber’s oversight of the Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers is a clear indica-
tion that this is the least powerful trigger mechanism. The drafters of the
Statute envisaged state party and Security Council referrals as more authori-
tative. As such, there is arguably an implicit hierarchy in the Statute’s jurisdic-
tional trigger mechanisms. For a Security Council referral, uniquely, the
preconditions of nationality based or territorial jurisdiction otherwise
required by Article 12 of the Statute do not apply.62 The Security Council ef-
fectively has ‘quasi-constitutional’ powers stemming from Chapter VII of the
UN Charter and Articles 13 and 16 of the Rome Statute.63 The politics of
Security Council referrals as particular grounds of ICC jurisdiction are thus
significant.
Two of the situations in the Court’s docket relate to non-party states that
have been referred by the Security Council. For illustrative purposes, we will
juxtapose these two referrals of situations, in Sudan and Libya, with two
other potential situations, in Palestine and Sri Lanka, that were brought to
the Security Council’s attention by UN authorities, without the recommended
resulting referral. These particular geopolitical selectivities are demonstrative
of broader TWAIL claims as to the ways in which colonial legacies and imper-
ial interests continue to structure the operation of international law.
61 P. Menon, ‘Self-Referring to the International Criminal Court: A Continuation of War by Other
Means’, 109 AJIL Unbound (2016) 260.
62 C. Safferling, International Criminal Procedure (Oxford University Press, 2012), at 88^90; A.
Cassese, International Law (2nd edn., Oxford University Press, 2005), at 456^458.
63 Cassese, ibid., at 456^458. See generally B. Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right
of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective (Kluwer Law International, 1998).
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A. Two Referrals: Sudan and Libya
The impetus towards the Security Council referral of the situation in Darfur to
the ICC originated in the creation of the International Commission of Inquiry
on Darfur in 2004, which recommended that the ‘Security Council immedi-
ately refer the situation of Darfur to the International Criminal Court, pursu-
ant to Article 13(b) of the ICC Statute’.64 The Security Council did so in
Resolution 1593,65 specifying that the referral was rooted in the Council’s
Chapter VII powers. In this light, the Security Council referral mechanism
can be seen as extending a form of purported universal jurisdiction. The refer-
ral led to arrest warrants being issued by the ICC for a number of accused,
including Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. While the Commission of
Inquiry had found no basis to conclude that acts of genocide were committed
in Darfur, the United States insisted on declaring that genocide had in fact
occurred ç arguably for the dual purposes of deflecting attention from the
nature of its war on Iraq at the time, and to lend weight to calls for humanitar-
ian intervention in Sudan.66 In bringing his missionary verve to the ICC’s pros-
ecutorial strategy, Ocampo was determined to indict al-Bashir for genocide.
This triggered an inevitable backlash against humanitarian agencies in
Sudan when the indictment was issued, as well as ongoing debates over im-
munity and overreach by the ICC.
In Libya, the UN Human Rights Council established a similar International
Commission of Inquiry in the context of the Gaddafi regime’s crackdown on
the 2011 popular uprising.67 The Security Council referred the situation in
Libya to the ICC in Resolution 1970,68 and soon thereafter authorized air and
naval intervention ç to be effected by the north Atlantic powers and their
64 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations
Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2005/60, 25 January 2005, at 5, 145^149, 162. The Darfur
Commission of Inquiry argued that the UN Security Council through its Chapter VII powers
could make the referral to the ICC despite Sudan not being a state party. Sudan had previously
taken the initial step of signing the Rome Statute but did not ratify it, and in 2008 informed
the Secretary-General that: ‘Sudan does not intend to become a party to the Rome Statute.
Accordingly, Sudan has no legal obligation arising from its signature on 8 September 2000’.
Sudan, Depositary Notification: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc.
C.N.612.2008.TREATIES-6, 26 August 2008. The language of this communication mirrored
that of the ‘unsigning’of the Rome Statute by the United States in 2002.
65 SC Res. 1593, 31 March 2005.
66 See, for example, S. Fake and K. Funk,The Scramble for Africa: DarfurçIntervention and the USA
(Black Rose Books, 2009); M. Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and theWar on
Terror (Three Rivers Press, 2010); M. Mamdani, ‘The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War,
Insurgency’, 29 London Review of Books (2007) 5. For an illuminating personal reflection on
the ‘error’ of ‘pounding the drum of ‘‘genocide’’’ in the context of Sudan, see also A. de Waal,
‘Writing Human Rights and Getting It Wrong’, Boston Review, 6 June 2016.
67 The Commission’s mandate was to investigate human rights violations and international crimes
and ‘to make recommendations, in particular, on accountability measures, all with a view to
ensuring that those individuals responsible are held accountable’. Human Rights Council Res.
S-15/1, ‘Situation of human rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’, UN Doc. A/HRC/S-15/1, 25
February 2011, x11.
68 SC Res. 1970, 26 February 2011.
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Gulf allies ç in Resolution 1973.69 The Office of the Prosecutor immediately
opened an investigation: ‘the ICC flew into Libya on the wings of the NATO
bombers’70, plunging itself into a scenario designed to extend beyond the man-
dated responsibility to protect civilians into a self-appointed ‘responsibility for
regime change’.71 Within three months, in June 2011, the Trial Chamber issued
the requested arrest warrants for Muammar Gaddafi (with the case against
him subsequently terminated following his death), Saif Gaddafi and Abdullah
al-Senussi for crimes against humanity (murder and persecution) allegedly
committed across Libya in February 2011, through the state apparatus and se-
curity forces. The swiftness with which the investigations, indictments and
warrants came ç in the context of the coercive referral of a state to which
access for the ICC was limited ç is in marked contrast to other situations,
including those involving consenting states, where preliminary examinations
have trundled on for years and have yet to reach a point of determination.
The referral and the attempts of the ICC to proceed against Saif Gaddafi and
al-Senussi have been marred by wrangling with the post-Gaddafi Libyan
authorities, who assert their own ability and willingness to prosecute. Libya
challenged the admissibility of the cases before the ICC, successfully in al-
Senussi’s case72 and unsuccessfully in Saif Gaddafi’s case.73 This discrepancy
was ostensibly grounded in the notion that Libya’s ability to prosecute the re-
spective cases was differentiated, at least partially, by Libya having control
over the Tripoli detention facility in which al-Senussi was being held, but not
that of Saif Gaddafi in Zintan. In a context of two competing governments
(where the government in Tripoli was not the one recognized by Western
states) and numerous other groups exercising control in different parts of the
country, this indicates a very simplistic view by the Court of the situation left
behind by NATO in Libya, a situation far more complex and fragmented than
a simple government/opposition binary. The mutually reinforcing nature of
the relationship between the ICC and the Security Council was emphasized
again in December 2014, with the Court this time referring Libya back to the
Security Council, after issuing a non-compliance finding against the Libyan
government for failure to transfer Saif Gaddafi to the Hague74 (notwithstand-
ing the fact, as noted above, that the Court itself had previously determined
that the Libyan government did not have control over him).
Also significant, from a geopolitical perspective, is that the Security Council’s
Darfur and Libya referrals explicitly excluded the Court’s personal jurisdiction
69 SC Res. 1973, 17 March 2011.
70 V. Nesiah, ‘Libya, Impunity, and the International Criminal Court’, Jadaliyya, 28 June 2012.
71 A. C ubukc u, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Libya and the Problem of Transnational Solidarity’,
12 Journal of Human Rights (2013) 40, at 43.
72 Decision on Admissibility ^ Abdullah Al-Senussi, Gaddafi and Al-Senussi (ICC-01/11-01/11 OA
6), Appeals Chamber, 24 July 2014.
73 Decision on Admissibility ^ Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Gaddafi and Al-Senussi (ICC-01/11-01/11 OA
4), Appeals Chamber, 21 May 2014.
74 Decision on Non-Compliance, Gaddafi (ICC-01/11-01/11), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 10 December
2014.
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over nationals of non-party states outside Sudan and Libya, respectively, for
any acts or omissions arising out of military operations authorized by the
Council itself.75 In effect, the Council referred jurisdiction to the ICC over
Sudanese and Libyan natives, but not certain intervening military forces ç in
the Libyan case, for example, the United States troops involved in the NATO
intervention. The prejudicial dual standards are clear. While the technical
legal capacity of the Security Council to do this has been challenged in com-
mentary,76 there has been no suggestion of the Security Council’s wishes
being challenged by the Court. Calls for the ICC to investigate alleged NATO
war crimes in Libya,77 for instance, have been predictably ignored.
B. Two Non-referrals: Sri Lanka and Palestine
While aspects of the protracted Sri Lankan ethnic conflict continue to grind on,
state forces effectively defeated the LTTE, or ‘Tamil Tigers’, in 2009. There were
up to 40,000 civilian casualties in the months leading up to the climax of the vio-
lence in May 2009.78 The UN Secretary-General and the former Sri Lankan
President, Mahinda Rajapaksa, agreed to a commitment to redress and account-
ability. The Secretary-General subsequently appointed a Panel of Experts to
advise him on accountability for the violation of international human rights and
humanitarian law during the final phrase of the war. The Panel’s recommenda-
tion calls for the establishment of an independent international mechanism to
monitor the Sri Lankan Government’s initiation of accountability proceedings to
investigate the alleged violations and to collect evidence of past crimes. The rec-
ommendation, perhaps surprisingly, does not explicitly suggest recourse to the
ICC.79 And despite demonstrable evidence from the Panel’s report of the commis-
sion of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the parties to the conflict,
international criminal justice mechanisms have not been engaged.
With Sri Lanka not being party to the Rome Statute, the only possibility of
operationalizing the ICC’s jurisdiction is through a Security Council referral.
As the hostilities came to a devastating conclusion in 2009, the Security
Council could only muster a meek press statement, condemning the LTTE for
acts of ‘terrorism’ over many years and demanding their surrender.While ex-
pressing concern at reports of continued use of heavy calibre weapons by
state forces in areas with high concentrations of civilians, the Security
Council emphasized the ‘legitimate right of the Government of Sri Lanka to
combat terrorism’.80 Questions of accountability and impunity have not been
75 SC Res 1593, 31 March 2005, x6; SC Res 1970, 26 February 2011, x6.
76 See, for example, R. Cryer, ‘Sudan, Resolution 1593, and International Criminal Justice’, 19 LJIL
(2006) 195.
77 D. Bosco, ‘Russia to ICC: investigate NATO’, Foreign Policy, 18 May 2012.
78 Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, supra note 2, x
137.
79 Ibid., Recommendation 1B.
80 Security Council Press Statement on Sri Lanka, UN Doc. SC/9659, 13 May 2009.
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addressed since then. In March 2014, the UN Human Rights Council requested
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights ‘to undertake a comprehensive
investigation’ into alleged international crimes ‘with a view to avoiding impun-
ity and ensuring accountability’.81 International human rights organisations82
and theTamil diaspora83 remain eager about the prospect of ‘delivering justice’
and ‘ending impunity’ in Sri Lanka,84 but a Security Council referral to the
ICC remains beyond the horizon of likely developments.
In the case of Palestine, the 2009 ‘Goldstone Report’ of the Fact-Finding
Mission commissioned by the UN Human Rights Council returned findings
that the Israeli military deliberately targeted civilians and destroyed civilian in-
frastructure during its Operation Cast Lead offensive against the Gaza Strip in
2008-2009.85 The Report recommended that the Security Council refer the
situation in Gaza to the Prosecutor of the ICC pursuant to Article 13(b) of the
Rome Statute.86 No referral was made, despite the analogous nature of the find-
ings and recommendations of the Fact-Finding Mission with other UN commis-
sions that have resulted in the creation of ad hoc tribunals or referrals to the
ICC.
The Office of the Prosecutor also played its role in deflecting the possibility of
an investigation into the situation in Palestine. Following the termination of
Israel’s bombardment of the Gaza Strip in 2009, the Palestinian Authority sub-
mitted a declaration to the Registrar of the ICC accepting the jurisdiction of
the Court, under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statue, over international crimes
committed in Palestine since the Court came into operation on 1 July 2002.87
Whether the Court could accept jurisdiction was considered to hinge on the
question of Palestine’s status ç whether it could be considered a state for the
purposes of the Rome Statute. An elaborate consultation process undertaken
by the Office of the Prosecutor ç in which it organized roundtables with
NGOs and practitioners, pursued extensive and substantive engagement with
the Palestinian legal team and instigated a dialogue with scholars and legal
81 Human Rights Council Res. 25/1, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/25/1, 9 April 2014.
82 Amnesty International, No Real Will to Account: Shortcomings in Sri Lanka’s National Plan of
Action to Implement the Recommendations of the LLRC, ASA 37/010/2012, 30 August 2012.
83 K. Navaratnam, ‘Post-conflict Sri Lanka needs Canadian R2P’, Embassy, 28 March 2012; H.
Sivalingam, ‘Canada can help Sri Lanka’,The Sun, 17 January 2013.
84 S. Xavier, ‘Looking for ‘Justice’ in all the Wrong Places: An International Mechanism or
Multidimensional Domestic Strategy for Mass Human Rights Violations in Sri Lanka?’ in D.
Bass and A. Amarasingam (eds), Sri Lanka: The Struggle for Peace in the Aftermath of War
(Hurst/Oxford University Press, 2014).
85 ‘While the Israeli Government has sought to portray its operations as essentially a response to
rocket attacks in the exercise of its right to self-defence, the Mission considers the plan to have
been directed, at least in part, at a different target: the people of Gaza as a whole.’ Report of the
United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, supra note 6, x1883.
86 Ibid., x1969(e).
87 International Criminal Court (Press Release), ‘Visit of the Minister of Justice of the Palestinian
National Authority, Mr. Ali Khashan, to the ICC’, 22 January 2009. The transfer of jurisdiction
dating back to 2002 would grant the Court the potential to investigate the situation in the
West Bank and Gaza on a broader temporal and geographic scale than solely the crimes com-
mitted during Operation Cast Lead.
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authorities (resulting in the investment of huge amounts of time and resources
from all parties on the understanding that this was a genuine and serious pro-
cess of discovery) ç lasted for more than three years.88 The sum result of this
process was two perfunctory paragraphs in a short statement issued by the
Office of the Prosecutor in April 2012, one of the last acts of Ocampo’s tenure,
declaring that it could not decide on Palestine’s competency to grant jurisdic-
tion under Article 12(3).89 Palestine’s statehood was subsequently recognized
by the General Assembly later in 2012, giving cause to Palestinian civil society
organizations to petition Ocampo’s successor, Fatou Bensouda, to proceed pro-
prio motu on the basis of the 2009 Article 12(3) declaration. She indicated she
would not do so without either Palestinian ratification of the Rome Statute, or
a new Article 12(3) declaration.90 On the back of much campaigning by
Palestinian civil society, the Palestinian authorities eventually did both ratify
the Statute and submit an Article 12(3) declaration in January 2015,91 precipi-
tating an obligatory preliminary examination of the Office of the Prosecutor.
As noted above though, there is no guarantee that this will result in a full
investigation.
Beyond the mechanics by which jurisdiction is triggered, there are also legit-
imate grounds to suspect that even if the ICC were to investigate these situ-
ations, it may not work to the broader strategic advantage of the Tamil or
Palestinian self-determination movements. The focus of international criminal
justice on individual responsibility forecloses the field’s ability to tackle the
more structural implications of colonisation92 ç from the fragmentation of in-
digenous communities and the line-drawing of unnatural boundaries93 to the
othering of racialized communities in public discourse. Between a narrow indi-
vidual accountability mandate and a desire to go with the flow of global geo-
politics, the institutions of international criminal justice have been unable or
unwilling to offer antidotes to the symptoms of imperial relations, whether in
Kosovo or Sierra Leone, Libya or Afghanistan.94 But if it is indeed the case
that the international criminal law project ç like international law more gen-
erally ç has reproduced colonial legacies more than it has challenged them,
88 See further M. Kearney and J. Reynolds, ‘Palestine and the Politics of International Criminal
Justice’ in Schabas, et al., supra note 27, at 407.
89 International Criminal Court (Office of the Prosecutor), ‘Situation in Palestine’, 3 April 2012.
90 F. Bensouda,‘The Truth about the ICC and Gaza’,The Guardian, 29 August 2014, at https://www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/29/icc-gaza-hague-court-investigate-war-crimes-
palestine (visited 24 June 2016).
91 State of Palestine, Declaration Accepting the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court,
31 December 2014; State of Palestine, Accession to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, Depositary Notification, UN Doc. C.N13.2015.TREATIES-XVIII.10, 2 January
2015.
92 Clarke, supra note 12.
93 O. Okafor,‘Re-Defining Legitimacy: International Law, Multilateral Institutions and the Problem
of Socio-Cultural Fragmentation Within Established African States’ (PhD Thesis, University of
British Columbia, Faculty of Law, 1998); M. Mutua, ‘Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral
and Legal Inquiry’, 16 Michigan Journal of International Law (1994) 1113.
94 Clarke, supra note 12.
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the fact that Tamils and Palestinians and a diversity of Third World peoples,
social movements and rights activists continue to place hope in international
criminal law beseeches us to consider its counter-hegemonic potential from a
TWAIL perspective.
4. TWAILing International Criminal Justice?
The first formal ThirdWorld Approaches to International Law conference took
place in 1997.95 That same year, Mutua published what can be read as an
early TWAIL appraisal of the ad hoc tribunals.96 Many of the concerns ex-
pressed by Mutua over the nature of international criminal justice remain as
valid today as they were then; some even more so in relation to the inability
or unwillingness of the international criminal law project to grapple with
underlying causes of conflict or unsettle global market forces. Mutua did not
foresee the pace at which the prosecutorial enterprise would crystallize as a
central feature of the international legal landscape, however. In particular, his
claim that a permanent International Criminal Court was unlikely and unvi-
able was very quickly overtaken by developments in practice. Given the biases
that have revealed themselves through that Court’s design and operations in
the intervening period, renewed and continued reflection on international
criminal law from a TWAIL perspective is warranted. This includes questions
for those social movements and civil society organizations in the global South
that retain a faith in the emancipatory potential of criminal justice.
There is no single answer to the question of why self-determination move-
ments of peoples such as the Palestinians or the Tamils have articulated sup-
port for international criminal accountability processes. Such peoples and
movements are obviously not monolithic in character. For some elements
within them, there are pragmatic reasons to invest in international criminal
law ç as a deterrent and means of protection against further atrocity, as a
form of retribution against the adversary, or in pursuit of international legitim-
acy. For others, it is simply the case of a lack of viable emancipatory alterna-
tives. It is a frustrated turn to legal outlets after civil disobedience, armed
struggle or political insurrection against the violence of the state or the occu-
pier have failed, or a product of the limited avenues available to a self-determin-
ation cause some 50 years after the heyday of Third World national
liberationism. For some of the more politically attuned legal interventions, the
engagement of international criminal institutions is a purely tactical interven-
tion, an instrumental move that feeds into a broader anti-imperial strategy;
law as means rather than ends. Whereas in other senses the hope placed in
international justice by activists in the global South has been underpinned by
a bona fide commitment to the rule of (international) law, and a faith in its
95 K. Mickelson, ‘Taking Stock of TWAIL Histories’, 10 International Community Law Review (2008)
355.
96 Mutua, supra note 14.
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unrealized potential. In such legal activism, there can be a tendency ‘to ascribe
a positive quality to international law and thus quarantine it from any colonial
practice through the familiar device of the law/politics binary’. This allows for
the retention of ‘a quiet confidence in the idea of law as a weapon of the weak
that would work better if only it could be implemented more effectively’.97
This enforcement deficit argument is an incomplete view of law, however,
and fails to fully capture the dichotomy between law’s content and its form.
For peoples in the global South, the hope of global justice has not been accom-
panied by the type of power needed to transform the aspirations of resource re-
distribution, racial equality or reparations into reality. Not enough space has
been opened up in mainstream and even critical legal discourse to challenge
the presupposition that there must be an international criminal law, despite
its systemic biases.98 When considering what the radical response ought to be
in such a situation, the obvious answer might appear to speak in favour of
abandoning or dismantling the institutions of international criminal law alto-
gether. But for writers like Patricia Williams, there is a critical race element
upon which critiques of concepts of ‘law’, ‘rights’ or ‘justice’ are contingent.
Williams suggests that ‘‘‘[r]ights’’ feels new in the mouths of black people. It is
still deliciously empowering to say. It is the magic wand of visibility and invisi-
bility, of inclusion and exclusion, of power and no power.’99 She notes the reli-
ance on the law as a means to constructing one’s identity and formulating
one’s demands and rights. This is ultimately rooted in the anxieties that stem
from histories of racial subordination, exclusion and violence.
For peoples traditionally excluded from the sites of international justice and
subjected to imperial violence that is invariably coupled with impunity, decon-
structionist critiques of international criminal law from the academies of the
North (and rhetorical denouncements from the post-colonial elites of the
South) may not speak to their social and political agendas.While TWAIL schol-
arship is still finding its collective voice when it comes to international crim-
inal law specifically,100 there is much we can draw from its broader
engagement with the field of public international law, and its internal reflec-
tions and debates.
TWAIL is said to have retained a ‘surprisingly reformist agenda’101 through
its reluctance to depart from the arena of international law. For TWAIL’s
critical reconstructionists, the potential of international law lies in its trans-
formation from below. International law can be deployed as both shield
97 M. Burgis-Kasthala, ‘Over-Stating Palestine’s UN Membership Bid? An Ethnographic Study on
the Narratives of Statehood’, 25 EJIL (2014) 677, at 691.
98 G. Baars, ‘Making ICL History: On the Need to Move Beyond Pre-fab Critiques of ICL’, in C.
Schwo« bel (ed.), Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law: An Introduction (Routledge,
2014), at 196.
99 P.Williams,The Alchemy of Race and Rights (Virgo, 1993), at 164.
100 See, for example, the symposium introduced in J. Gathii, ‘Introduction to Symposium on
TWAIL Perspectives on ICL, IHL, and Intervention’, 109 AJIL Unbound (2016) 252.
101 L. Eslava and S. Pahuja, ‘Between Resistance and Reform: TWAIL and the Universality of
International Law’, 3 Trade, Law & Development (2011) 103, at 105.
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(against the ongoing impacts of colonial relations) and sword (in tactical pur-
suit of progressive or anti-imperial struggle). It can evoke, in this sense,
Williams’ magic wand of the oppressed and marginalized. There is also the
sense that TWAIL’s duality of engagement with international law ç of both re-
sistance and reconstruction ç coalesce in such a way that there are possibili-
ties to first provide the necessary break and rupture, and then to generate a
praxis of (new, or different) universality.102 In this instance, there is a turn to
what may superficially seem like the old in arguing for the emancipatory po-
tential of international law, as the early post-colonial Third World jurists did.
But underneath lies a radical shift to reflect on the existing dynamics of
power and politics in the everyday life of international law.103 For Chimni, the
reconstruction must take place across multiple layers, including the personal
and the ethical.104
Here then we must consider what radical engagement with the field of inter-
national criminal law ç in a bid to transform, subvert or resist that field from
a Third Worldist perspective ç might look like. Can social movements have
the impact on international criminal law that they have sought in other fields
of international law?105 Are international criminal tribunals sites where ‘coun-
ter-systemic logics’106 can be exploited and tactics of rupture107 deployed in
such a way as to instrumentalize law as part of broader socio-political strug-
gles for emancipation from economic exploitation? Is there space ‘to take ad-
vantage of the content of international law ::: to mitigate the effects of its
form?’108 With such questions in mind we will attempt to conclude with some
thoughts on what might be conceived of as ThirdWorld approaches to interna-
tional criminal justice. Where Michelle Burgis-Kasthala offers a valuable exe-
gesis of the TWAIL methodological moves that could enrich international
criminal law as an academic field,109 we seek to build on that by sharpening
our focus on what ‘TWAILing’ international criminal justice might entail for
the institutional and operational aspects of the field. We do so mindful of
TWAIL’s parallel engagement paradigms of both resistance and reconstruction,
and identify three broad registers across which such engagement might be
pursued (in concert or independently): redressing operational selectivities;
reconceptualising material jurisdiction; and resisting more fundamentally the
102 Ibid.
103 L. Eslava, Local Space, Global Life: The Everyday Operation of International Law and Development
(Cambridge University Press, 2015).
104 B.S. Chimni, ‘The Self, Modern Civilization, and International Law: Learning from Mohandas
Karamchand Gandhi’s Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule’, 23 EJIL (2012) 1159.
105 B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World
Resistance (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
106 S. Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of
Ideology (Oxford University Press, 2007), at 144.
107 J.Verge' s, De la strate¤ gie judiciare (Minuit, 1986).
108 R. Knox, ‘Marxism, International Law, and Political Strategy’, 22 LJIL (2009) 413, at 436.
109 M. Burgis-Kasthala, ‘Scholarship as Dialogue? ICL,TWAIL and the Politics of Methodology’ in
this symposium.
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idea of individualized criminal liability as the dominant paradigm of transi-
tional justice.
On the first (reconstructionist) register, rectifying two basic selectivities110 is
paramount: the geographic or group-based selectivity of situations investigated
by the ICC, and the operational selectivity of existing crimes prosecuted. From
a TWAIL perspective, meaningful transformation when it comes to situation
selectivity would, in simple terms, begin with the investigation of crimes com-
mitted by global North forces and their allies in the global South. This may in
turn require a recalibration of the ICC’s referral and deferral mechanisms,
including the role of the Security Council at the design level. It also necessi-
tates a greater consciousness on the part of international criminal law institu-
tions of the ongoing geopolitical ramifications of imperialism, as well as a
rupture of the civilising mission attitudes that continue to permeate those in-
stitutions (even if with a degree more subtlety than was the case in the rhetoric
of Crane or Ocampo). This could herald a shift when it comes to choices over
which situations to prioritize in the context of finite resources.
The operational questions of which crimes are then prosecuted in those situ-
ations can also be subjected to a reconstructionist approach. Although very
much a continuation of the lineage of Eurocentric laws of armed conflict111
and human rights law,112 the content of international criminal law does offer
certain norms that, when framed in the post-colonial context, can counter
and criminalize contemporary colonial practices. For example, despite the
ways in which ‘the laws of war, from their inception, were subtly designed to
exclude non-European peoples from their protection’,113 parts of the normative
content of international criminal law do speak to more systemic elements of
colonial projects. Forcible population transfer and apartheid are marked out as
crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute. Article
8(2)(b)(viii) of the Statute also prohibits the settlement of occupied territory
by an occupying power. As such, the very structure of settler-colonialism in a
context of occupation is rendered criminal.
The purpose of this provision is set out in the commentary toArticle 49(6) of
the Fourth Geneva Convention from where it originates: ‘It is intended to pre-
vent a practice adopted during the Second World War by certain Powers,
which transferred portions of their own population to occupied territory for
political and racial reasons or in order, as they claimed to colonize those terri-
tories. Such transfers worsened the economic situation of the native
110 For a detailed typology and analysis of selectivity in international criminal law, see A. Kiyani,
‘Group-based Selectivity and Local Repression: The Custom and Curse of Selectivity’ in this
symposium.
111 F. Me¤ gret, ‘From ‘Savages’ to ‘Unlawful Combatants’: A Postcolonial Look at International
Humanitarian Law’s ‘Other’’, in A. Orford (ed.), International Law and Its Others (Cambridge
University Press, 2006) 265.
112 M. Mutua,‘Human Rights and Powerlessness: Pathologies of Choice and Substance’, 56 Buffalo
Law Review (2008) 1027.
113 Me¤ gret, supra note 111, at 268.
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population and endangered their separate existence as a race.’114 Although this
exhibits a wilful blindness to colonisation by European powers outside the con-
text of Nazism and the Second World War, it nonetheless has a relevance to
the land policies and territorial expansions of the present. Such settler-
colonialism is intrinsic to concerted and well-documented Israeli policy in the
West Bank,115 and has the potential to be prosecuted were the ICC to seize
itself fully of the situation in Palestine. This is certainly central to the thinking
of Palestinian activists and officials, in their endeavour to assert a form
of agency in the process.116 Similar practices are emerging within the context
of post-war Sri Lanka as successive governments forcibly resettle segments of
the population from south to north. If international criminal law is to have a
chance of proving any emancipatory potential, then, it might start with the
prosecution of contemporary crimes of colonization. The exercise of jurisdic-
tion over situations such as Palestine or Sri Lanka would give the ICC meaning-
ful opportunities to do so.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, a TWAIL perspective would pre-
scribe reconceptualization of the material conduct and structures that are
criminalized in the first instance. While the existing population transfer
crimes ç were they to be prosecuted as crimes against humanity in the con-
text of the colonial present ç might at least begin to get at some of the land
control and migration issues that go to the structural conditions underlying
socio-economic inequality, where they are rooted in the Geneva Conventions
they will remain limited to traditionally defined and bracketed settings of
armed conflict and belligerent occupation. Any meaningful reconstructionist
approach to international criminal law will need to go beyond the problems of
unequal enforcement and operational selectivity to the essence of the actions
and forms of violence criminalized at the design level. If international criminal
law is to take seriously its claim to be part of a project of global justice, it
must at some point begin to tackle the economic contexts of war, exploitation
and scarcity: ‘to reconsider the boundaries of criminalization’ and question,
for example, ‘the legality of sanctions regimes, the role of structural adjustment
and austerity programs imposed by international financial institutions, the
competition between China andWestern states for access to resources in third
states, or the propriety of reparations for slavery and colonialism’.117 Instead,
the ‘core crimes’ catalogue of genocide, crimes against humanity and war
114 J. Pictet (ed.), Commentary to Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time ofWar (ICRC, 1958), at 283.
115 See, for example, International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of aWall
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory [2004] ICJ Rep 136.
116 When Palestinian officials suggested that the first matter they wanted the ICC to investigate
was Israel’s settlement activity, international criminal lawyers were quick to point out that
this form of agency is not allowed for. See K.J. Heller, ‘Unfortunately, the ICC Doesn’t Work
the Way Palestine Wants It To’, Opinio Juris, 18 January 2015, available online at http://opinio-
juris.org/2015/01/18/palestine-really-no-idea-icc-works/ (visited 24 June 2016).
117 A. Kiyani, ‘International Crime and the Politics of Criminal Theory: Voices and Conduct of
Exclusion’, 47 NYU Journal of International Law & Politics (2015) 129, at 200.
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crimes (plus aggression) remain rooted in a more restricted conceptualization
of violence. These crimes cannot address many of the collective interests of
global South peoples that are impacted by the structural violence of economic
coercion, resource extraction, global wealth distribution and enforced impov-
erishment, nor in many instances the slow violence meted out by the toxic
remnants of certain weaponry. Yet the definition of international crime is lim-
ited in such ways, arguably without clear normative foundation.118
So why is the victim of child soldier recruitment constructed as more deser-
ving than the child victim of structural adjustment? Why is socially produced
mass starvation or grotesque inequality less odious a scourge or more imagin-
able an atrocity than the crimes currently being prosecuted? The production
of law in this way is not a neutral process but reflects choices and historical
patterns in the development of international legal practice that have tended to
relegate the significance of socio-economic inequality and marginalize global
South voices and interests.119 This was evident over the course of the
International Law Commission’s attempts from the 1950s to the 1990s to
define and normatively root an expanded list of international crimes. A minor-
ity of global North states (that consistently supported or abstained from con-
demning South African apartheid120) maintained their conservative
opposition to the inclusion of crimes such as apartheid, colonial domination,
foreign intervention and severe environmental damage.121 These interventions
forced ‘serious departures from the ILC’s principled approach to developing a
coherent normative understanding of the conduct that constituted the most
serious international crimes’ and produced instead a scenario reflective of
‘Western interpretations of Nuremberg, on the basis that the status quo
served their interests.’122 By the end of the process, as a result, the ILC’s set of
12 crimes had been whittled back down to the four core crimes now included
in the jurisdiction of the ICC, leaving the list ‘both normatively discordant and
pragmatically archaic.123
The subject-matter jurisdiction proposed for the International Criminal Law
Section of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights does gesture towards
redressing this, covering a more expansive list of crimes, some of neocolonial
character ç including mercenarism, corruption, money-laundering and illicit
118 Ibid., at 132^133.
119 A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University
Press, 2005).
120 For a full account of this, see J. Reynolds, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and
the Ghosts of Apartheid’, in D. Keane and Y. McDermott (eds), The Challenge of Human Rights:
Past, Present and Future (Edward Elgar, 2012), at 204^209.
121 See, for example, International Law Commission, ‘Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind: Comments and Observations Received from Governments’, UN Doc. A/
CN.4/448, 1 March 1993. As Kiyani notes: ‘The United States, United Kingdom, and
Netherlands were the strongest opponents, complaining not that the language of the provi-
sions should be redrafted or refined in particular ways but that the new prohibitions should
be completely removed.’ Kiyani, supra note 117, at 148.
122 Kiyani, supra note 117, at 150.
123 Ibid., at 203.
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exploitation of natural resources.124 While this might offer the beginnings of
the direction that a more TWAIL-oriented system might take, it remains a judi-
cial model that cannot avoid substantively mimicking the European template,
much as post-colonial political formations failed to think beyond the
European nation-state model. In this sense,TWAILing the field of international
criminal justice with a purely reconstructionist agenda will remain profoundly
difficult because of the inescapable historical baggage of rule-of-law civilizing
missions, and the homogeneity of international legal language and forms.
The third register which must be engaged, therefore, is that of resistance in a
deeper sense to the proliferation of the international criminal law project.
Ultimately, international criminal accountability is not an emancipatory end
in itself for marginalized peoples or self-determination struggles in the global
South. Since ‘criminal prosecution can only grapple with the most basic as-
pects of colonialism and its residue’,125 the prosecution of colonial crimes
would merely be a tactical hook to be pursued as part of a broader anti-colonial
strategy. In that sense, strategic options on the register of resistance to the
field of international criminal law in its current guise must be considered in
addition to the reconstructionist agenda sketched above.
This is in keeping with TWAIL interventions that seek to prioritize local
remedies and domestic prosecutions,126 as well as with the need to continu-
ously think about whether non-criminal processes will often or ultimately
offer a better path towards the objectives of deterrence, reparation, truth and
reconciliation. It would also envisage a de-subjectification of the global South
from Northern legal cultures and a delinking from vertical global governance
structures. Here, a TWAIL approach to international criminal law can draw,
for example, on the experience of Latin American states and transnational en-
vironmental and human rights movements in resisting the architecture of
international investment law and beginning to build alternatives to the global
North’s corporate-friendly international arbitration mechanisms.127 Deference
to the particular priorities, concerns, lived experiences and cultural histories
of the South, especially as they relate to land and resources, can only engender
more holistic and communal understandings of justice. Resistance from the
periphery to the Hague’s hegemony as the centre of international justice
would benefit from the evolving organic intellectual traditions of indigenous
social movements, alter-globalization and decoloniality.128 This can open
space for the recognition and inclusion of non-Western epistemologies and
legal cultures ç on their own terms, and in contrast to Crane’s reductive
stereotypes of Third World incivility ç and prepare the ground for top-down
124 Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice
and Human Rights, AU Doc. EX.CL/846(XXV), Annex 5, 15 May 2014, Article 28.
125 Kiyani, supra note 117, at 162.
126 Anghie and Chimni, supra note 22; Xavier, supra note 84.
127 See, generally, M. Sornarajah, Resistance and Change in the International Law on Foreign
Investment (Cambridge University Press, 2015).
128 See, for example,W. Mignolo, The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial
Options (Duke University Press, 2011).
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criminal processes to ultimately give way to anti-colonial sensibilities and indi-
genous notions of justice and restitution. Toward this end, continuing and
deepening the exposure of international criminal justice to TWAIL perspec-
tives is essential.
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